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A PRICE ON VOLUNTEERISM:
THE PUBLIC HAS A HIGHER DUTY TO
ACCOMMODATE VOLUNTEERS*
Lauren Attard**
[N]o matter how big and powerful government gets and the
many services it provides, it can never take the place of volunteers.
— Ronald Reagan1
A volunteer is a person who can see what others cannot see, who
can feel what most do not feel.  Often, such gifted persons do not
think of themselves as volunteers, but as citizens in the fullest
sense, partners in civilization.
— George H. Bush2
Volunteers are essential to the proper functioning of America.
Non-profit organizations normally do not have enough resources
to retain the requisite number and quality of paid staff members.3
More important than increasing the size of the workforce, how-
ever, are the special skills and interests that volunteers often bring
to an organization.  The personal attachment, perspective, and ded-
ication that these volunteers offer are very distinct from the ser-
vices of a typical employee.4  Volunteers often have personal
experience in the non-profit organization’s cause and are successful
in other aspects of their lives.  In fact, business executives and ce-
* Presented at the Society for Disability Studies Annual Meeting, 2006, as part
of a panel entitled “Re-Imagining Disability Law: Prospects, Perils and Possibilities.”
** J.D., 2007, Fordham University School of Law.  I am grateful to Professor Ravi
Malhotra at the University of Ottawa, Evan Brustein, founder of beyondtheramp.
com, Leslie Gold, Jordan Schwartz, and Rosa D’Abate.
1. Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the 1985 President’s Volunteer Action Awards
Luncheon, Public Papers of the Presidents, Apr. 22, 1985, available at http://www.
reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1985/42285a.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
2. Michelle McMahon, Guest Column, NEWARK ADVOC. (OHIO), Aug. 11, 2005,
at 6A (quoting former President George H. Bush).
3. See, e.g., Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n, National Events and Programs Volunteer
Opportunities, http://www.mdausa.org/help/natevents.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2007).
4. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Brudney, Volunteer Involvement in the Delivery of Public
Services: Advantages and Disadvantages, 16 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 283,
285 (1993) (“[Volunteers] may bring . . . specialized skills not possessed by employees
(for example, legal, computer, or technical skills) that yield improvements in services
or programs. . . . [They] may personalize and enhance the delivery of public
services.”).
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lebrities often volunteer many hours in support of their favorite
causes.5
Instead of paying their volunteers, organizations often compen-
sate volunteers by providing them with benefits.  The benefits can
range from perks such as access to facilities to the “warm, fuzzy
feeling” that comes from spending time working with the benefi-
ciaries of the organization.  Both parties normally see the relation-
ship as an equal exchange of services: the volunteers provide their
time and energy in exchange for access to the organization’s people
and facilities.
One such organization that utilizes the services of volunteers is
the Muscular Dystrophy Association (“MDA”).  The MDA,
funded only by private donations, provides research services, vari-
ous forms of educational outreach, and community services includ-
ing summer camps for children with muscular dystrophy.6  Of the
two million volunteers that help the MDA annually, the MDA’s
famous chairman, comedian Jerry Lewis, is its “number-one
volunteer.”7
Despite the vital position many volunteers occupy, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) does not protect these
volunteers from discrimination.  In Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy
Ass’n, the court ruled that an MDA summer camp is not required
to accommodate volunteers with disabilities—even volunteers with
muscular dystrophy.8  According to the court, the MDA’s require-
ment that all volunteers, including administrative volunteers, have
the ability to lift and care for a camper is not discriminatory.9
People with disabilities have been protected from discrimination
since the enactment of the ADA in 1990.10  The drafters of the
ADA intended it to “provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disa-
5. For example, Andre Agassi and Bill Gates both volunteer considerable
amounts of time running their foundations. See Andre Agassi Charitable Foundation,
Home Page, http://www.agassifoundation.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2007); Bill & Me-
linda Gates Foundation, About Us, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/AboutUs (last
visited Apr. 17, 2007).
6. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n, MDA Fact Sheet, http://www.mdausa.org/publica-
tions/mdafacts.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
7. Id.
8. 427 F.3d 1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 2005).
9. See infra text accompanying note 56. R
10. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 2007).  Prior to the ADA, various other
federal statutes helped to protect some rights of people with disabilities, such as Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-99 (West 2007).
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bilities.”11  To achieve this goal, the ADA protects against, among
other things, discrimination in places of public accommodation
under Title III12 and discrimination against employees under Title
I.13  Places of public accommodation include private entities such
as “a place of recreation,” “a place of education,” and a “social
service center establishment.”14  Title III, for example, would pro-
tect a child with disabilities who attends a summer camp.  Under
Title I, a protected employee is defined as “an individual employed
by an employer,” and an employer is a “person engaged in an in-
dustry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks . . . and any
agent of such person.”15  Title I, therefore, would protect an em-
ployee working at a summer camp.  The ADA, however, does not
clearly address where volunteers fit into this structure, and this
omission has led to the failure to accommodate volunteers as ex-
emplified by the Bauer decision.
This Comment first examines the issues presented in Bauer and
the court’s rationale for finding that volunteers are not protected
under Title III.  Part II explores the requirements and differences
between Title I and Title III and provides some history of the defi-
nitions of “volunteer” and “employee.”  Part III presents a public
duty thesis arguing that the responsibility of providing accommo-
dations should not belong solely to employers in the context of em-
ployees, or public accommodations in the context of patrons, but to
all factions of society.  This Comment concludes with an explora-
tion in Part IV of the public duty thesis and how such a thesis may
work under our current system.
I. BACKGROUND AND EXPLANATION OF BAUER
There are a myriad of degrees and types of diseases character-
ized as muscular dystrophy.16  Whereas some children with muscu-
lar dystrophy have severe physical and medical disabilities, some
children and adults with muscular dystrophy exhibit very mild
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(2).
12. Id. § 12181(7)(I)-(L).
13. Id. § 12111.
14. Id. § 12181(7)(I)-(L).
15. Id. § 12111(4)-(5).
16. See, e.g., Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n, Diseases, http://www.mdausa.org/disease/
(last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
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physical effects.17  Camp Chihowa is an MDA camp for children
and young adults with all degrees and types of muscular dystro-
phy.18  Nevertheless, the camp’s management told two former vol-
unteers who have muscular dystrophy, Gina Bauer and Suzanne
Stolz, that they could no longer provide their services at the
camp.19  The management decided to enforce its policy that volun-
teers meet physical requirements “necessary to fulfill the primary
purpose of the camp and to ensure its safe operation.”20  The pol-
icy, which requires that all volunteers are “of sufficient size and
strength to assist with the needs of campers” and are able to “lift
and care for campers,” has been in effect since at least 1993.21
Both Ms. Bauer and Ms. Stolz, who cannot “lift and care for a
camper” because of the effects of muscular dystrophy, were volun-
teer counselors at Camp Chihowa for five years between 1995 and
2000.22  Each volunteer devoted a substantial amount of time to the
camp, both administratively and as a traditional counselor.  Both
Ms. Bauer and Ms. Stolz were volunteer co-directors of the camp’s
newspaper and yearbook in 2002.23  Moreover, Ms. Bauer not only
assisted a new camp director in major organization and planning of
the camp in 2001, but in the previous year she served as a personal
attendant to a camper.24  The job of a personal attendant is very
time intensive.  Typically, the camp assigns one volunteer counselor
to each camper as her personal attendant to accompany the child at
all times.25  Other volunteer counselors, in addition to performing
their duties, fill in when the personal attendants are not available.26
As the district court explained, in addition to performing as attend-
17. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Muscular
Dystrophy Information Page, http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/md/md.htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 17, 2007).
18. Camp Chihowa MDA Summer Camp Kansas City, http://www.ibelievedesign.
com/chihowa (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
19. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer II), 427 F.3d 1327, 1328-29 (10th
Cir. 2005).
20. Id. at 1329.
21. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer I), 268 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (D.
Kan. 2003) (“MDA has had such a policy at the national level for at least 12 years,
although the Wichita staff who ran the camp in the past were apparently unaware of
the policy.”).
22. Bauer II, 427 F.3d at 1328.
23. Id.
24. Bauer I, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1286.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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ants, these volunteers generally “form a strong bond with children
at the camp . . . .”27
Meanwhile, in 2003, the MDA added a question to the volunteer
application asking whether the applicant can lift and care for a
camper.  That same year the camp director informed Ms. Bauer
that she could no longer volunteer because she did not meet these
requirements.28
The district court opinion hints that the plaintiffs’ disabilities
were not the only factor that motivated the director’s decision to
deny them the chance to volunteer.29  Specifically, the opinion ex-
plains that although the MDA typically aims for Camp Chihowa to
have fifty volunteers to care for its forty campers, the camp had
seventy volunteers in 2002.30  A camp director objected to the
camp’s large number of volunteers and was upset that volunteers
did not have duties to occupy all of their time at the camp.31  In
particular, the director was disappointed that Ms. Stolz and Ms.
Bauer’s positions as newspaper and yearbook editors only required
them to work about two hours a day, providing enough free time to
partake in such activities as swimming in the pool, which required
the assistance of other volunteers.32  The director was upset that
the volunteers were enjoying the same benefits as campers, and
even taking resources away from campers.33
The plaintiffs filed suit against the MDA, alleging that the
MDA’s conduct violated both the Kansas Act Against Discrimina-
tion34 and Title III of the ADA,35 which governs places of public
accommodation.36  The district court rejected the plaintiffs’ conten-
tion that Title III governed their claim.37  The court instead relied
on a Senate Report which explained, “Title III is not intended to
govern any terms or conditions of employment by providers of
27. Id. at 1288.  The court goes on to explain, “the camps are not operated for the
purpose of providing benefits, privileges, or advantages to the volunteers.” Id.
28. Bauer II, 427 F.3d at 1328.
29. Id. at 1331.
30. Id.
31. Bauer I, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1288.
34. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 to -1121 (West 2005).
35. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131-34 (West 2007).
36. The case was filed in Kansas state court, but was removed to the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas under the court’s federal question jurisdic-
tion.  Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n, 427 F.3d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir. 2005).
37. Bauer I, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1293.
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public accommodations or potential places of employment; em-
ployment practices are governed by [T]itle I of this legislation.”38
The district court remained unconvinced by the Third Circuit’s
reasoning in Menkowitz v. Pottstown Memorial Medical Center,
which allowed an independent contractor to assert a claim under
Title III and not Title I, because he was not an employee.39  The
defendant in Menkowitz argued that use of the term “individuals”
in a place of public accommodation referred to in Title III40 only
protects the “clients and customers” of a place of public accommo-
dation and not, as the plaintiff argued, independent contractors.41
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit looked to
legislative history, congressional intent, and case law before com-
mencing its analysis of the statute.42  The court acknowledged that
the terms “individuals” and “place of public accommodation”
could be broadly construed,43 but found the defendant’s argument
that “individuals” only includes “clients and customers” too nar-
row.44  “Clients and customers” is a term used in only a small sub-
section of Title III.45  In fact, that particular subparagraph in Title
III states that the definition of “individuals” as “clients and cus-
tomers” is only “[f]or purposes of clauses (i) through (iii) of this
subparagraph . . . .”46  In other words, the drafters declined to ex-
tend this definition to the whole of Title III.
The Menkowitz court also noted that the plaintiff would have no
recourse under the ADA if he was not covered by Title III.47  The
court found it unlikely that Congress intended to leave out the
class of independent contractors, given the broad nature and scope
of the ADA.48
Despite the Third Circuit’s careful and thorough explanation of
its rationale for supporting the plaintiff’s claim, the district court in
Bauer agreed with the defendant’s position in Menkowitz.  It found
that “public accommodation laws are designed to protect custom-
38. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 58 (1989).
39. 154 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1998).  “[Title I] does not protect independent con-
tractors.”  PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 692 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a) (West 2007).
41. See Menkowitz, 154 F.3d at 117.
42. See id. at 119-21.
43. Id. at 121.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) (West 2007).
47. Menkowitz, 154 F.3d at 122-23.
48. Id. at 123.
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ers or patrons.”49  The district court also criticized the Menkowitz
court for “inject[ing] Title III standards into . . . agency questions
and thereby essentially re-writ[ing] the scope of Title I coverage.”50
Looking to agency law to compare volunteers with employees, the
Bauer court reasoned that because volunteers create potential tort
liability for the organization, they cannot be patrons and therefore
must be assessed as employees.51
The Bauer court went on to explain that even if Title III applied
to the plaintiffs, it would not provide relief.  According to the
court, the “MDA has a compelling interest in selecting appropriate
volunteers who can ensure the safety of the campers . . . .”52  The
court did not provide evidence to support this contention; instead it
held that the compelling interest was “clear” because most of the
campers “are minors and many . . . have disabilities.”53
The ADA does not have a “compelling interest” exemption.54
When an individual poses a “direct threat to the health or safety of
others,” Title III allows a place of public accommodation to deny
an accommodation to that individual.55  The district court did not
once mention the direct threat standard.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit explained it was “persuaded
that . . . the criteria for volunteer counselors are not discrimina-
tory,” and it therefore did not need to decide whether Title III of
the ADA applies to adult volunteer counselors but “assume[d], ar-
49. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1293 n.4 (D. Kan.
2003).
50. Id.  No other decision has disagreed with the holding of the Menkowitz court
on this issue, yet no court has directly addressed the issue.
51. Id. at 1293.
52. Id.  In its analysis, the court also “borrow[s] from Title I” to explain that “[t]he
evidence shows that being able to assist in lifting campers . . . is . . . an essential
function of the position of Volunteer Counselor.” Id.
53. Id.
54. The “compelling interest” standard normally refers to the test for state action
that has a disparate result for people with disabilities.  Scholars have disagreed on
whether people with disabilities are a “protected class” warranting review under a
“compelling state interest” standard. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by
the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV.
947, 964 (1997) (arguing that the ADA calls for a “compelling state interest justifica-
tion for discrimination”). But see Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last
Barrier to Jury Service for People with Disabilities, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 59
n.245 (1997) (“The text of the [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] requires the
Court to apply its ‘compelling interest’ test; the text of the ADA contains no similar
directive.”).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(3) (West 2007) (“The term ‘direct threat’ means a sig-
nificant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modifica-
tion of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or
services.”).
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guendo, that it does.”56  The court’s reasoning in its determination
that the criteria were not discriminatory is inconsistent with both
Title I and Title III.
In its apparent application of Title III, the court only looked to
the standards of Title I.  The court explained that because emer-
gencies are reasonably foreseeable, the requirement of lifting and
caring for a camper is an “essential function.”57  An “essential
function” is a necessary feature of a position that an employer is
not required to modify for an employee with a disability under Ti-
tle I.58  The court also correctly explained that Title I does not re-
quire that the MDA shift these essential duties to other employees
who are able to perform them.59  The Tenth Circuit concluded its
reasoning by stating, “we cannot conclude that Title III requires
the MDA to simply continue its past practice of allowing Ms. Bauer
and Ms. Stolz to perform the duties they are capable of perform-
ing . . . .”60  Therefore, the court reasoned, “we cannot hold that
MDA violated Title III of the ADA when it began enforcing its ‘lift
and care for a camper’ rule, even though such enforcement denied
Plaintiffs the opportunity to participate as volunteer counselors.”61
In other words, the Tenth Circuit used Title I standards to conclude
that the MDA did not violate Title III.
II. DETAIL OF TITLE I AND TITLE III62
The MDA violated the congressional intent of both Title I and
Title III of the ADA when it failed to accommodate volunteers.
The Tenth Circuit’s decision, however, confounded Title I and Title
III to find no liability on the part of the MDA.  The drafters of the
56. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer II), 427 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir.
2005).  This Comment, therefore, cannot expand on the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning as
to whether Title III applies to volunteers.
57. Id. at 1332.
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12113 (“It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination . . .
that an alleged . . . selection criteria . . . has been shown to be . . . consistent with
business necessity . . . . The term ‘qualification standards’ may include a requirement
that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individ-
uals in the workplace.”).
59. Bauer II, 427 F.3d at 1333.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Title II, which also covers accommodations, will not be discussed in this
Comment.  Not only was Title II not at issue in Bauer II, but a court has already ruled
that Title II does not cover the dismissal of a volunteer. See Tawes v. Frankford
Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at *19 (D. Del. Jan.
13, 2005).  Instead, the Delaware District Court in Tawes ruled that Title II only
“guard[s] against discrimination in providing that service.” Id.
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ADA could not have intended to allow a court to reach a conclu-
sion on liability by combining Title I and Title III, each of which
protects people with disabilities in very different situations.  Al-
though this Comment argues that Title III should be used to cover
volunteers because it would provide volunteers with more protec-
tion, the plaintiffs in Bauer could prevail under either Title I or
Title III.
A. The Plaintiffs in Bauer Satisfied Title I
Title I, which prohibits discrimination of employees with disabili-
ties,63 should cover the plaintiffs in Bauer.  The district court in
Bauer claimed that it did not analyze the case under Title I but
implied that the plaintiffs would at least be covered by Title I as
employee-like agents.64  To be protected by Title I, the person must
be “otherwise qualified,”65 which the ADA defines as “an individ-
ual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.”66
In the 1979 case Southeastern Community College v. Davis,67 the
Supreme Court construed “otherwise qualified” individuals as
those who can perform all of the functions of a program except
those that are the limited by their disability.68  Eight years later, in
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, the Court noted that
“‘an individualized inquiry’ is necessary.”69  The Court required
the fact finder to delve into the details of the plaintiff’s disability to
avoid “prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear” of the plaintiff’s
disability.70  The decision in Arline is important because it recog-
nized that a person is not required to meet every requirement, but
63. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1990).
64. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer I), 268 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1292 n.3
(D. Kan. 2003) (“Plaintiffs do not claim that the defendant violated Title I.  Accord-
ingly, the court expresses no opinion as to whether plaintiffs could state a claim for
relief under that Title.”).
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).  The predecessor to the ADA, Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act, also referred to “otherwise qualified” individuals in the same context as
the ADA.  29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 2007).
67. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
68. Id. at 406.
69. 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (discussing whether the plaintiff, a school teacher
with tuberculosis, is otherwise qualified despite her disability).
70. Id. (requiring the fact finder look to medical examinations to determine
whether the plaintiff was actually contagious or if her employer had an “unfounded
fear” of transmission of the disease).
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merely the “essential” requirements of a position.71  The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit further clarified the
point when it explained that if the individual cannot meet the es-
sential functions of a position because of her disability, a court
should look at whether a reasonable accommodation would allow
the individual to perform the essential functions.72
Title I has afforded employers wide deference to determine
which job functions are “essential.”73  The Fifth Circuit has con-
cluded that these essential functions must “bear more than a mar-
ginal relationship to the job at issue.”74  A district court in
Alabama has explained that the employer has the right to deter-
mine which functions are essential to a job.75  In fact, the Title I
definition of a “qualified individual with a disability”76 strongly de-
fers to policies defined before the individual with a disability was
hired.  As one commentator has noted, however, it provides “no
deference to job descriptions that are prepared after an applicant
has accepted a position.”77  The employer must also require that
the employees actually perform the functions deemed essential.78
In other words, if the elimination of such duty does not fundamen-
tally alter the position, then the duty is not essential.79
The court in Bauer should not have found that the requirements
to “lift and care for a camper” are essential to the job of an admin-
istrative volunteer.  Rather, the court should have recognized that
the plaintiffs were successful volunteer counselors who had never
performed these lift and care functions but were nevertheless per-
forming other essential functions.  In fact, Ms. Bauer’s history as a
71. RUTH COLKER & ADAM A. MILANI, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINA-
TION 134 (5th ed. 2005).
72. Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1393-94 (5th Cir. 1993).
73. 42 U.S.C.A. §12111(8) (West 2007) (“[C]onsideration shall be given to the em-
ployer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential . . . .”); see generally
COLKER & MILANI, supra note 71, at 134. R
74. Chandler, 2 F.3d at 1393-94.
75. Johnston v. Morrison, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 777, 778 (N.D. Ala. 1994); see also
Eric Wade Richardson, Comment, Who Is a Qualified Individual with a Disability
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 189, 215 (1995).
76. “[If] an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or in-
terviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8).
77. Richardson, supra note 75, at 217 n.30 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8)). R
78. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. (West 2007) (“The inquiry into whether a particular
function is essential initially focuses on whether the employer actually requires em-
ployees in the position to perform the functions that the employer asserts are
essential.”).
79. Id.; see also Thomas Simmons, The ADA Prima Facie Plaintiff: A Critical
Overview of Eighth Circuit Case Law, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 801-02 (1999).
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personal attendant counselor directly contradicts the MDA’s argu-
ment that the counselors needed to perform these “essential func-
tions” for the campers’ safety.
Further, the Bauer district court looked solely to the fact that the
counselor’s job description required that she lift and care for a
camper.80  While a court should provide strong deference to the job
description that was in place before the employee started, it should
not do so in a case where, as in this case, the employer did not
enforce these descriptions until much later.  Accordingly, the court
should have determined that Camp Chihowa discriminated against
the plaintiffs by denying them a position based on arbitrary
criteria.
B. The Plaintiffs in Bauer Satisfied Title III
As opposed to Title I, which prohibits the discrimination of em-
ployees with disabilities, Title III prohibits discrimination that de-
nies an individual with a disability “the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dations of any place of public accommodation.”81  Title III cases
often turn on whether a defendant fits the statutory definition of a
place of public accommodation82 and thus falls within the realm of
the statute.  This distinction is important because employers have
wider deference in determining whether they can legally exclude a
person with a disability.
Although the MDA camps are clearly public accommodations,83
the Bauer district court objected to the classification of the plain-
tiffs as “patrons of the public accommodation.”84  In one of the
leading cases on this issue, PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, the Supreme
Court held that golfer Casey Martin was a patron of a public ac-
commodation, the PGA Tour, even though Martin was pursuing
golf professionally.85  The Bauer court distinguished Martin from
80. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer I), 268 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1293-94
(D. Kan. 2003) (“[T]he position of Volunteer Counselor was created for the primary
purpose of providing physical assistance and supervision to campers.  This fact is
borne out by the evidence, including the job description . . . .”).
81. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a).  Title III also prohibits the conferral of an accommo-
dation different than that provided to other individuals. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii).
82. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (holding that the PGA
Tour is a public accommodation).
83. A place of education, a day-care center, and a health spa are typical examples
of places of public accommodation as enumerated in the ADA.  42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12181(7)(J)-(L).
84. Bauer I, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
85. Martin, 532 U.S. at 662.
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the facts in the case before it by explaining that golfers “play at
their own pleasure . . . [and] are not bound by any obligations typi-
cally associated with employment,” unlike the MDA camp, which,
the court stated, directed the plaintiffs on the tasks to perform just
as it directs its employees.86  The difference between the MDA’s
directions to the plaintiffs and the PGA Tour’s directions to Martin
is indistinguishable.  Golfers are directed by the PGA Tour on the
tasks they are to perform.87  Golfers are required to start at the tee
of the first hole, and proceed until reaching the green of the eight-
eenth hole.  Golfers are given precise tee times by the PGA Tour,
are required to show up for photo opportunities and cocktail par-
ties, and are bound by a strict dress code.88  The level of control
exerted by the PGA Tour over Martin is no different than the con-
trol that the MDA had over its volunteers.  In both instances, the
plaintiffs are performing tasks for their own pleasure and are not
bound by the typical obligations of employment.
The MDA camp should be liable for discrimination because it
failed to make an accommodation for the plaintiffs.  If the MDA
camp is a public accommodation, then under Title III it can only
refuse to provide an accommodation if it would “fundamentally al-
ter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages or accommodations.”89  In Martin, the Court found that in
order to determine that allowing Casey Martin to use a golf cart
would “fundamentally alter” the tournament, this exception must
impair the “peripheral tournament rule[’s] . . . purpose.”90  The
Court explained that the ADA requires the PGA Tour to provide
Martin with a “chance to qualify for and compete in the athletic
events,”91 whereas the dissent disagreed and commented that the
PGA Tour was simply required to grant access to the game.92  The
Bauer appellate court, on the other hand, recognized that Ms.
Bauer and Ms. Stolz did not want to fundamentally alter, or for
that matter, make any alterations to the way that they had worked
for the camp in the past.93  Nevertheless, the Bauer appellate court
86. Id. at 680 n.33.
87. See, e.g., Prof’l Golf Ass’n, The Rules of Golf, http://www.pga.com/play/the-
rules-of-golf.cfm (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
88. See id.
89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West 2007).
90. Martin, 532 U.S. at 690.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer II ), 427 F.3d 1326, 1332 (10th Cir.
2005); see also Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer I ), 268 F. Supp. 2d 1281,
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explained that Title III does not require the MDA to continue to
compromise the “essential function” of the volunteer position.94
Again, the court was referring to a provision from Title I while it
was discussing Title III.  The court instead should have considered
an easy way to accommodate the plaintiffs and achieve the goal
that the counselors be able to lift and care for a camper: assign the
volunteers tasks that they can physically perform and never leave
them alone with campers who may need assistance in an
emergency.
The Bauer district court also failed to examine Camp Chihowa’s
need for volunteers.  Although the court heavily weighed the fact
that the camp hires volunteers to care for the campers,95 it also
mentioned that the volunteers “form a strong bond with children at
the camp.”96  The plaintiffs wanted the opportunity to form strong
bonds with the children; in other words, they wanted the same ac-
cess to the camps that other volunteers without disabilities have.
Like the PGA Tour, the camp should not deny volunteers full ac-
cess to the campers by providing only special one-day “guest ap-
pearances,”97 but instead should allow volunteers with disabilities
the opportunity to participate and enjoy the benefits of total
participation.98
The plaintiffs in Bauer did not pose “a direct threat to the health
or safety of others,” a provision that would have allowed the defen-
1294 (D. Kan. 2003) (“Plaintiffs have not identified any reasonable modifications to
MDA’s policy that would allow them to perform this essential function.”).
94. Bauer II, 427 F.3d at 1333.
95. Bauer I, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 1294 (“[I]t would fundamentally alter the nature of
the services provided at the camp if MDA were required to modify its eligibility crite-
ria and to accept Volunteer Counselors who are unable to provide such assistance.”).
96. Id. at 1288.
What is MDA Summer Camp? In simple terms it is a place where kids with
Muscular Dystrophy from the ages of 6 to 21 come for one week in every
year to enjoy activities they might not have a chance to participate in any
other time, and have a fun time.  Yet, Summer Camp is much more than
that, it is [a] place where lifelong friendships are made, a place where love
and caring is genuine . . . .
Camp Chihowa Home Page, http://www.ibelievedesign.com/chihowa/ (last visited
Apr. 17, 2007).
97. See supra text accompanying note 92 (discussing Justice Scalia’s dissent in R
Martin).
98. See supra text accompanying note 91; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(a) (West R
2007) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment . . . .”).
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dant to escape liability.99  This exception is not meant to allow em-
ployers to ignore the interests of people with disabilities for every
public safety concern.100  Instead, an employer needs to balance the
interests of the employee and the public, as the court did in Ander-
son v. Little League Baseball, Inc.101  In that case, the defendant
tried to argue that Anderson, a base coach who used a wheelchair,
posed a direct threat to the children by being on the field.102  In
assessing the rationale of this argument, the court balanced the ef-
fect on the children of prohibiting the plaintiff from coaching with
the risk to their safety, and ultimately found for the plaintiff.103  In
Bauer, however, the court failed to examine the benefit that such
volunteers bring to the camp.  The benefits of having a positive role
model with muscular dystrophy acting as a volunteer and caregiver
outweigh the irrational fear that the plaintiffs could not react prop-
erly in the event of an emergency.  The court instead accepted the
MDA’s contention that its stringent criteria were necessary for the
camp’s proper operation.  Using a scare tactic, the camp exagger-
ated the potential benefits of the policy: the camp contended that if
every volunteer could assist in an emergency, parents and campers
would feel more comfortable.104  The court failed to consider the
other safeguard the camp had been using for years before 2002—
each camper had a volunteer assigned to her twenty-four hours a
day.105  Parents and campers likely feel just as comfortable know-
ing that a child will always have a volunteer by her side to assist in
an emergency, as they would if the defendant’s policy proposal was
enacted.
99. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(3) (“The term ‘direct threat’ means a significant risk to
the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies,
practices or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.”).
100. Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 345 (D. Ariz. 1992)
(“The determination that a person poses a direct threat to the health or safety of
others may not be based on generalizations or stereotypes about the effects of a par-
ticular disability; it must be based on an individual assessment that conforms to the
requirements of [28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c)].”).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 343 (“[The players] should not have the added concern of avoiding a
collision with a wheel chair during their participation in the game.”).
103. Id. at 345 (“An individualized inquiry is essential if the law is to achieve its
goal of protecting disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice, stereo-
types, or unfounded fear.”).  When determining if the plaintiff posed a direct threat,
the court took into consideration the fact that the coach had served as a Little League
coach for three years without an accident. Id.
104. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer I), 268 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1294 (D.
Kan. 2003).
105. Id. at 1286.
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The camp should also recruit volunteers who not only care
deeply for children, but specifically for children with muscular dys-
trophy.  As much as able-bodied counselors can form strong bonds
with children affected by muscular dystrophy, the emergency bene-
fits they bring cannot outweigh the positive role modeling provided
by volunteers with muscular dystrophy, such as Ms. Stolz and Ms.
Bauer.
C. Volunteers versus Employees
Agency law protects volunteers by providing them with the same
tort protections as an employee; even without an agreement, a vol-
unteer may be a servant of the person accepting services106 who
would therefore be liable for any torts of the servant/volunteer.107
Non-profit organizations do not compensate their volunteers, and
therefore volunteers customarily receive non-monetary benefits
from an organization in exchange for their time, such as the use of
an organization’s services, facilities, and accommodations.  Thus,
determining whether a volunteer should be treated as an employee
or as a patron is simply a matter of perspective.
Federal law determines a person’s status as an employee.108  The
United States Supreme Court defined employees, for the purposes
of “social legislation,” as persons economically dependent on the
businesses for which they perform services.109  The question of
whether a person is a volunteer or employee is common in employ-
ment discrimination scenarios.  In Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer
Fire Co., for example, the Delaware District Court looked to em-
ployment discrimination cases to determine that a volunteer
firefighter is not an employee for the purposes of Title I of the
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 225 (West 2006) (“One who volun-
teers services without an agreement for or expectation of reward may be a servant of
the one accepting such services.”).
107. Id. § 401 (“An agent is subject to liability for loss caused to the principal by
any breach of duty.”).
108. See, e.g., Tawes v. Frankford Volunteer Fire Co., No. 03-842-KAJ, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 786, at *10 (D. Del. Jan. 13, 2005) (using case law from the employment
discrimination context to decide that a volunteer fire fighter is not an employee under
Title I when the employer did not have the requisite fifteen employees); see also Cal-
deron v. Martin County, 639 F.2d 271, 272-73 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the ques-
tion of whether a Florida deputy sheriff is an “employee” within the meaning of Title
VII is a question of federal law).
109. United States v. W. M. Webb, Inc., 397 U.S. 179, 185 (1970).
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ADA.110  The court noted that compensation is required to find
that a person is an employee.111
D. Title III Provides the Best Protection for Volunteers
Because of the nature of volunteering, volunteers most closely
resemble patrons of public accommodations, who are protected
under Title III.  Volunteers offer their time because they enjoy vol-
unteering and reap a personal benefit from their volunteer work.
In return for their time, volunteers often receive the use of “goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations,”
which are benefits that must be rendered equally to people with
disabilities under Title III.112  In fact, the Bauer court’s interpreta-
tion of Martin speaks strongest to Title III’s protection of volun-
teers: Title III protected Martin because golfers “play at their own
pleasure . . . [and] are not bound by any obligations typically asso-
ciated with employment.”113
III. THE PUBLIC DUTY THESIS
Bauer is a troubling case.  It exemplifies the fringe problems that
occur with the ADA—many organizations, including the non-profit
MDA, do not proactively accommodate people with disabilities
even if personal ethos would impose this duty on people as citizens.
All social legislation has the problem of the ADA; when requiring
large groups of individuals to act according to a moral norm, many
individuals will object even if their own personal ethos would have
driven them to act in accordance with the legislation.114  The ADA
is a floor, and some states have enacted legislation that surpasses
its requirements.115  For reasons inapplicable to this Comment,
however, some courts have limited the application of the ADA to
the point where it has subverted the original purpose of achieving
110. Tawes, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 786, at *12-13 (citing Graves v. Women’s Prof’l
Rodeo Ass’n, 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990)).
111. Id. at *11 (citing O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1997)).
112. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182 (West 2007).
113. Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass’n (Bauer I), 268 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1292 (D.
Kan. 2003); see also supra text accompanying note 86. R
114. This idea is not new. See, e.g., LAO-TZU, TAO TE CHING 58 (Stephen Mitchell
trans., Harper Perennial 1992) (1988) (“Try to make people moral, / and you lay the
groundwork for vice.”).  Lao-Tzu’s suggestion is that the leader “serve[s] as an exam-
ple.” Id.
115. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(a) (West 2007) (“Although the federal
act provides a floor of protection, this state’s law has always, even prior to passage of
the federal act, afforded additional protections.”).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-3\FUJ306.txt unknown Seq: 17 10-SEP-07 13:44
2007] A PRICE ON VOLUNTEERISM 1105
equality.116  The public duty thesis is based on the opposite idea; it
calls for all factions of society to change the way that people with
disabilities are cared for and to proactively help accommodate
them.117
Until recently, Western countries cared for people with disabili-
ties according to the charity-based model, which is rooted in the
idea that people with disabilities are different, disadvantaged, inca-
pable, and in need of public assistance.  Institutions had been the
primary caregivers since the Middle Ages.118  In Eastern countries,
on the other hand, families and society at large care for people with
disabilities.119  Richard K. Scotch attributes the institutionalization
of people with disabilities in the West to the destruction of the
“family and community support systems.”120  Starting with Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”)121 and even-
tually the ADA, disability policy in the United States shifted away
from this charity-based model to a minority-group model, which
recognized the patterns of discrimination against people with disa-
bilities (often promulgated by the charity-based model) as the real
problem.122
116. See supra text accompanying note 11. R
117. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  George H. Bush’s quote that volun- R
teers are “partners in civilization” helps to explain the great ability that people who
voluntarily help others have to affect positive change to society.
118. People with disabilities, especially those with mental disabilities, were often
institutionalized for life. See, e.g., Rosanne Burton Smith et al., Does the Daily Choice
Making of Adults with Intellectual Disability Meet the Normalisation Principle?, 30 J.
INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY 226, 227 (2005) (“In the past, the institution-
alisation of individuals with intellectual disability severely restricted the possibilities
for development of personal control and self-determination . . . .”).
119. For a complete history of the care-giving institutions in the West, see RICHARD
K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABIL-
ITY POLICY 15-24 (2d ed. 2001); see also R. Srinivasa Murthy, Reaching the Unreached,
LANCET PERSP., Dec. 2000, at S39 (“At the time of independence in 1947, India—with
a population of more than 340 million—had only 10,000 psychiatric hospital beds, in
contrast to England, which had more than 100,000 such beds for a population a tenth
of the size of India’s.”).
120. SCOTCH, supra note 119, at 15 (“In most cultures, disabled people have been R
supported within the context of the family and the community.  In the West, however,
as family and community support systems broke down, physically and mentally dis-
abled persons were relegated to cultural institutions.”).
121. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(a) (West 2007) (“No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) . . . shall, solely by reason
of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination . . . .”).
122. SCOTCH, supra note 119, at 169 (defining the minority-group model as advo- R
cating that the “major barriers to social and economic participation facing people with
disabilities were discriminatory attitudes, policies, and physical environments”); see
generally Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability:
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Professor Harlan Hahn has advocated that courts interpret Sec-
tion 504 and the ADA using the minority-group model.123  Without
understanding this model, judges, lawyers, and legislators might ap-
ply a traditional charity-based model of alleviating disability dis-
crimination by “correcting impairments to the maximum extent
possible.”124  Professor Hahn also notes that courts have been re-
luctant to apply the ADA as stringently as they apply civil rights
legislation because people with disabilities have not traditionally
faced the same bigotry as racial minorities.125  He attributes the
“sympathetic endorsements” and “patronizing attitudes” of politi-
cians126 to their uneasiness with the subject,127 which in turn hin-
ders the achievement of equal rights because it does not encourage
candid dialogue.128  Though his conclusion is controversial, his ob-
servation is not: “[T]he relative lack of widespread public discus-
sion about the nature and meaning of disability reduces the
opportunities for judges and policymakers to gain the knowledge
necessary to make informed judgments about incidents of alleged
discrimination.”129
Professor Hahn’s recognition of the way courts and legislators
treat people with disabilities speaks to a much larger problem,
which, if solved, could end the struggle that people with disabilities
often need to overcome in order to receive proper accommoda-
tions.  In fact, the definition of “accommodation” highlights the
problem.  An accommodation is “something supplied for conve-
nience or to satisfy a need.”130  In other words, someone must ac-
tively supply—and implicitly pay for—this accommodation.
The Minority-Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 41 (1996) [hereinafter Hahn,
The Minority-Group Perspective].  The movement toward the minority-group model
can also be seen in the wide-scale deinstitutionalization of people with disabilities that
took place in the 1970s in the United States and the United Kingdom. See, e.g., J. Aa.
Nottestad & O. M. Linaker, Predictors for Attacks on People After Deinstitutionaliza-
tion, 46 J. INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 493, 494 (2002).
123. See Hahn, The Minority-Group Perspective, supra note 122, at 41; see also R
Harlan Hahn, Towards a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies,
SOC. SCI. J., Oct. 1985, available at http://www.independentliving.org/docs4/hahn2.
html.
124. Hahn, The Minority-Group Perspective, supra note 122, at 41.  He is not refer- R
ring to physically correcting impairments, but instead forcing people with disabilities
into the mold that society has created for people without disabilities.
125. Id. at 42.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 43.
128. Id. at 42.
129. Id.
130. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?va=ac-
commodation (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).
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Practically, the ADA must dictate who must provide the accommo-
dations to those subject to the ADA’s requirements, such as em-
ployers and owners of places of public accommodation, in order to
attach liability and give the ADA any legislative weight.  Yet the
ADA drafters wanted to eliminate daily discrimination of people
with disabilities,131 not just discrimination faced in the workplace
or in places of public accommodation.  The ADA seems to be aim-
ing for a disability rights activists’ dream: the duty to “accommo-
date” a person with a disability falls not only to employers, but to
all segments of society.  I have termed this duty the “public duty
thesis.”132
The public duty thesis is not new, nor is there an easy way to
achieve its goal.  As Bauer illustrated, interpretation of the ADA
can lead to gross abnormalities.  Widespread education of the mi-
nority-group model and the destruction of ideals fostered by the
charity-based model would help spur the drafting and interpreta-
tion of legislation.  Courts would in turn recognize the ADA
drafter’s intent to alleviate discrimination, not just the ADA’s cur-
rent limited applications of its anti-discrimination thrust.  If applied
by the courts, the public duty thesis could operate as a supplement
to the ADA, and not simply a justification for it.133  The public duty
thesis should cover the areas that legislation cannot cover.  It re-
quires not only an acknowledgment that the minority-group model
is the way to approach legislation, but also advocates for individu-
als to be proactive within their own communities.
This Comment advocates for a society in which accommodating
a person with a disability is not a legal obligation, but is instead a
courtesy for the realization that we all require a means to access.
131. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(4) (West 2007) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to
address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.”).
132. The public duty thesis developed from interactions with a close childhood
friend who has cerebral palsy and walks with crutches.  She often had friends help her
with basic tasks in school, such as carrying her books.  Instead of “helping” her in a
way that disabled her, her teachers and peers related to her in a way that actually
enabled her.  These small and seemingly insignificant acts would be powerful and in-
deed quite significant if reproduced on a wide scale.
133. One of the biggest fears in any disability rights case or legislation is the cost of
accommodation.  The public duty thesis would not cause any further expense than the
ADA, which studies have shown costs less than many expect.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Myths and Facts about the Americans with Disabilities Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
ada/pubs/mythfct.txt (last visited Apr. 17, 2007) (“A recent study commissioned by
Sears indicates that of the 436 reasonable accommodations provided by the company
between 1978 and 1992, 69% cost nothing, 28% cost less than $1,000, and only 3%
cost more than $1,000.”).
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Because humans cannot fly, architects and engineers have created
various ways for people to access the second floor of a building.  If
stairs are required in every two-story house occupied by humans,
why not a ramp for a place where a person with a physical disabil-
ity would likely need access?  When a student in middle school
breaks her leg, her friend will help her carry her books.  When a
pregnant woman cannot find a seat on the bus, common courtesy
calls for a person to give up the seat for her.  When a person with a
disability cannot alone lift and care for a camper in the event of an
emergency, the other counselors should ensure that the person
with a disability is not left alone with that camper.  None of these
duties belong to any person as an employer or as a supplier of a
public accommodation, but these duties belong to human beings
who are simultaneously able to make rational decisions to avoid
risk and help each other.
Emergency planning seems to be one of the trump cards that
employers play to relieve themselves of compliance with the
ADA.134  Emergencies, however, cannot be legislated away.  Legis-
lators, directors, campers, parents, and volunteers cannot know
how every different situation will play out; there is inherent risk in
every activity.  In emergency planning for camps and other places
of accommodation, the director typically assigns each person a role
that fits her needs and abilities.  The public duty thesis calls for
emergency planners to find a way to help people with disabilities
by placing them closer to emergency exits.  In a summer camp, this
could be achieved by allowing able-bodied counselors to evacuate
the campers, but not avoid the presence of counselors with disabili-
ties altogether.
Although the district and appellate courts’ analyses in Bauer are
troubling, the actions of the MDA are alarming.  Perhaps because
the MDA cares for people with disabilities, it should adhere to at
least the same standard, if not a higher standard, than a for-profit
company.  The camp discriminated against the same people it has
secured private funding to help.  If the MDA cannot treat people
with disabilities equally, who can?
Courts should also consider whether the drafters intended the
ADA to allow age to be a determining factor in the need for public
accommodation.  If MDA camps provide facilities to people under
the age of twenty-one,135 and a volunteer with muscular dystrophy
needs the same services as  campers with muscular dystrophy,
134. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text. R
135. MDA, National Events and Programs Volunteer Opportunities, supra note 3.
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should the ADA allow the MDA to refuse to supply those services,
as a place of public accommodation, to people with disabilities over
the age of twenty-one?
Congress should enforce the duty to accommodate people with
disabilities on non-profit organizations receiving federal funds for
the care of people with disabilities, as set out in the Rehabilitation
Act.136  The federal government often controls actions of states and
organizations by withholding funds; perhaps the government
should require disability rights organizations that receive federal
funds to go beyond the ADA and tailor job descriptions to people
with disabilities.137
IV. CONCLUSION AND SOME PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS
The public duty thesis obviously has inherent limitations.
Changing the way people think about individuals with disabilities
can only be achieved through widespread education, which is a dif-
ficult task.  Changing the way people think, however, was the goal
of the ADA.  This goal, although lofty, should not be abandoned.
Legislating safely is close to impossible.  The legislation in reac-
tion to the September 11th attacks shows that the government can-
not easily force its citizens into accepting what it deems a public
duty.138  Citizens have to be proactive and take individual responsi-
bility to go beyond legislation in order to help others and to move
this country forward.  Ronald Reagan, in his assertion that “gov-
ernment . . . can never take the place of volunteers”139 recognized
that volunteers have a greater ability to effect change than does the
government.
Groups like the MDA, United Spinal, and other disability rights
organizations are trying to educate the public about the issues fac-
ing people with disabilities.  Each of these organizations has
achieved commendable results.  For example, United Spinal is
largely responsible for the New York City transit system’s adapta-
tion of all buses for wheelchair accessibility.140  Although this ac-
136. See supra note 121. R
137. Ideally, federal, state, and local governments, too, would be major employers
of people with disabilities.
138. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516 (West 2007) (amending the Federal Wiretap Stat-
ute); Lorrie Thomas Lee, The USA Patriot Act and Telecommunications: Privacy
Under Attack, 29 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 371, 371 (2003) (critiquing the
USA PATRIOT Act and discussing the related privacy concerns).
139. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. R
140. United Spinal Ass’n, Accessible Transportation Background, http://www.
unitedspinal.org/advocacy/taxisforall/united-spinal%E2%80%99s-accessible-trans-
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complishment has a negligible impact on the able-bodied New
Yorker, its accomplishment for people with disabilities cannot be
overstated, as it is a step towards integration.  And, the integration
of people with disabilities into an able-bodied community can posi-
tively affect the way that an employer or storeowner perceives peo-
ple who use wheelchairs.  This is an amazing example of a change
that hopefully creates volunteers out of those employers and store-
owners who see people in wheelchairs on their morning bus ride.
Admittedly, social changes can be slow to take hold.  Small
changes to laws or the way in which those laws are enforced, how-
ever, can have a great effect on the way that people with disabili-
ties are treated.  For example, courts can easily promote a public
duty thesis by questioning the rationale an employer used in deter-
mining what an essential duty is for a particular position.  It is diffi-
cult for an outsider to determine the essential functions of a given
position.  Practically, the employer knows the essential functions of
a given job the best, and logically would hire those people who can
best perform those tasks.  If courts imposed a higher standard on
these employers, employers could avoid litigation by slightly modi-
fying the essential functions of a position if the essential function is
not adequately clear.  Likewise, Congress could amend the ADA
so that non-profit organizations are required to tailor job descrip-
tions to fit volunteers with disabilities.  For example, Ms. Bauer
and Ms. Stolz could be volunteer editors of the newspaper and the
yearbook so long as they can perform such functions required of
newspaper editors, not of personal attendant counselors.
Volunteers need to be accommodated, whether under Title I or
Title III.  The fact that volunteers do not fit nicely into the catego-
ries described in Title I or Title III does not excuse any organiza-
tion from not accepting people with disabilities as volunteers.  The
ADA clearly intended to protect people with disabilities from this
institutionalized discrimination, whether as employees or indepen-
dent contractors, customers or volunteers.  In order for this soci-
ety-changing legislation to be fully effective, however, legislators
and especially courts need to change the way they think about peo-
ple with disabilities who, unfortunately, remain an under-utilized
resource.
portation-background/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2007).  New York City still has not made
the subway system fully accessible.  For up to date information on New York City’s
accessibility for people with disabilities, see the Disabled Riders Coalition, Home
Page, http://disabledriders.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2007).
